Abstract. At Crypto 2013, Coron, Lepoint, and Tibouchi (CLT) proposed a practical Graded Encoding Scheme (GES) over the integers, which has very similar cryptographic features to ideal multilinear maps. In fact, the scheme of Coron et al. is the second proposal of a secure GES, and has advantages over the first scheme of Garg, Gentry, and Halevi (GGH). For example, unlike the GGH construction, the subgroup decision assumption holds in the CLT construction. Immediately following the elegant innovations of the GES, numerous GES-based cryptographic applications were proposed. Although these applications rely on the security of the underlying GES, the security of the GES has not been analyzed in detail, aside from the original papers produced by Garg et al. and Coron et al. We present an attack algorithm against the system parameters of the CLT GES. The proposed algorithm's complexityÕ(2 ρ/2 ) is exponentially smaller thanÕ(2 ρ ) of the previous best attack of Coron et al., where ρ is a function of the security parameter. Furthermore, we identify a flaw in the generation of the zero-testing parameter of the CLT GES, which drastically reduces the running time of the proposed algorithm. The experimental results demonstrate the practicality of our attack.
Introduction
In 2003, Boneh and Silverberg [3] introduced the concept of cryptographic multilinear maps by generalizing cryptographic bilinear maps. They proposed interesting applications based on the concept, such as the multipartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange and an efficient broadcast encryption. Until recently, it was an important, yet hard-to-achieve open problem to construct multilinear maps satisfying cryptographic requirements. At Eurocrypt 2013, Garg, Gentry, and Halevi [20] proposed the first candidate multilinear maps, called Graded Encoding Scheme (GES), having very similar cryptographic features to ideal multilinear maps. At Crypto 2013, Coron, Lepoint, and Tibouchi [12] proposed the second GES over the integers. The CLT construction has an advantage over the GGH construction; specifically, it allows one to use a desirable assumption such as the subgroup decision assumption, which does not hold with the GGH construction. Thus, the CLT construction has broader applications. Very recently, Langlois, Stehlé, and Steinfeld [28] improved the GGH construction in terms of the bit size of the public parameters. Immediately following the elegant inventions of the GES, they received significant attention from the cryptography community, and numerous cryptography applications based on the GES inventions were built; for example, programmable hash [19] , full-domain hash [25] , functional encryption [21, 22] , witness encryption [23] , and indistinguishability obfuscation [6, 21, 7] . Although these applications rely on the security of the underlying GES, the security of the GES itself has not been analyzed in detail, aside from the original papers produced by Garg et al. and Coron et al. This is the full version of a paper [29] presented at the CRYPTO 2014 conference. An instance of n-MPACD consists of x 0 (product of n primes) and polynomially many samples with errors chosen from (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ). †: Mild assumptions are necessary, which are specified in the paper.
Our Contributions
n-Masked Partial Approximate Common Divisors (n-MPACD). We begin by introducing a new number theoretic problem, called n-Masked Partial Approximate Common Divisors (n-MPACD), which is a generalization of the system parameters (such as the zero-testing parameter [12] and the re-randomization parameter [12, 9] ) from integer-based schemes such as multilinear maps [12] and Fully Homomorphic Encryptions (FHE) [9] . Roughly speaking, a problem instance is a product of η-bit primes x 0 = i p i and polynomially-many samples x j such that x j ≡ Q · r ij (mod p i ) where Q $ ← Z x 0 , r ij $ ← (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) and ρ η. Because of the unknown Q, it is unlikely to directly apply the meet-in-the-middle attack of Chen and Nguyen [8] ; therefore, it appears to be harder than the Partial Approximate Common Divisors (PACD) problem [26] . In fact, the attack algorithm of Coron, Lepoint, and Tibouchi (CLT) [12] , which is the most efficient currently known algorithm for n-MPACD, hasÕ(2 ρ ) complexity, although it employs the technique used in the Chen-Nguyen attack.
Exponentially Faster Attack for n-MPACD. We present an attack algorithm for n-MPACD, which is exponentially faster than the CLT attack. The proposed algorithm follows the basic flow of the strategy of the Chen-Nguyen attack [8] . However, several tricks are required to manage the unknown Q and several moduli. Our attack is based on the following observation for subset-sums of integers in the same interval (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ): given 2m integers, there are 2 2m different subset-sums (ignoring duplications), but such subset-sums range from (−2m2 ρ , 2m2 ρ ). That is, the number of subset-sums increases exponentially in m; however, those ranges increase only polynomially in m. Therefore, by slightly increasing m, we can find a collision among subset-sums. This observation is essential to our exponentially faster algorithm, as compared to the CLT attack. We summarize the comparison in Table 1 .
A Flaw in the Generation of the Zero-Testing Parameter. We apply the proposed attack algorithm to the system parameters of multilinear maps over the integers; in particular, the zerotesting parameter [12] . The complexity of both our attack algorithm and the CLT attack primarily depend on ρ, the size of errors r ij ; therefore, it is necessary to enlarge the size of errors. In the generation of the zero-testing parameter, the matrix H = (h ij ) ∈ Z n×n plays the role of (r ij ) in n-MPACD, indicating that the size of h ij is very important for the security of the CLT GES. For the functionality of the multilinear maps, the matrix H is defined to be unimodular, and to satisfy two bounds H ∞ ≤ 2 β and (H −1 ) ∞ ≤ 2 β . In [12] , the authors provided a method for generating H. However, we point out that the given method does not provide sufficient randomness in H; that is, the average size of each entry h ij in H is much less than expected. Eventually, this will weaken the security of multilinear maps over the integers. 
2 ) polynomially many bits O( log 2 ) polynomially many bits
Experimental Results. We provide several experimental results for our algorithm. In particular, we apply our attack algorithm to the implementation parameters on Small size for 52-bit security and Medium size for 62-bit security in [12] with a slight modification; the implementation in [12] used only a single zero-testing integer. However, we assume that a zero-testing vector is given, as in the original CLT GES. Our experimental results demonstrate that our algorithm requires less than 2 34.84 and 2 37.23 clock cycles on average for Small size and Medium size, respectively.
Outline
In the following section, we provide some preliminary information that should be helpful for reading this paper. In Section 3, we define our new problem, and investigate a relation between it and the system parameters of multilinear maps. Section 4 provides our attack algorithm along with a detailed analysis. We describe how to speed our basic algorithm up and provide implementation results of our algorithm on the parameters of multilinear maps over the integers in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss additional issues related to multilinear maps and our attack algorithms.
Preliminaries
Notation. Throughout the paper, λ is the security parameter, and we consider only discrete values; the interval notation [a, b] indicates all integers between a and b, containing a and b. Similarly, (a, b) and (a, b] notations also indicate respective sets of all integers contained in the corresponding continuous intervals. For integers a and p, the reduction of a modulo p is denoted by a (mod p) ∈ (−p/2, p/2]. Problem instances are defined by Chinese Remaindering with respect to n co-prime integers p 1 , . . . , p n , making it convenient to use the notation CRT p 1 ,...,pn (r 1 , . . . , r n ) (abbreviated as CRT (p i ) (r i )) to denote the unique integer
Fast Polynomial Algorithms
We consider polynomials with integer coefficients modulo x 0 . There are classic algorithms for fast polynomial arithmetic, which use the Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) [17, 4, 5] and have been used in various areas of cryptography; e.g., for efficiency improvement in protocols [10, 35, 24, 2] and in cryptanalysis [11, 8, 18] . In this paper, we use two fast polynomial arithmetic algorithms, each denoted by Alg F F T P oly and Alg F F T M P E , as subroutines; the algorithm Alg F F T P oly takes points as inputs and outputs a monic degree-polynomial over Z x 0 having input points as roots. The algorithm Alg F F T M P E takes a degree-polynomial f (x) over Z x 0 and points as inputs, and then it evaluates f (x) at input points and outputs the results. Alg F F T P oly (Alg F F T M P E , resp.) has quasi-linear complexity in the number of the input points (the degree of the input polynomial, resp.). We summarize the basic information regarding these fast polynomial algorithms in Table 2 . We omit details of these classical algorithms; instead, we refer to [36, 31] .
Masked Partial Approximate Common Divisors
Before providing our algorithm, we first generalize the problem instances for both the re-randomization parameter and the zero-testing parameter in the CLT GES. We believe that the following generalization will help readers to understand the security of the multilinear maps; specifically, both the hardness and weakness of the problem. We introduce a new number theoretic problem, which is a variant of (Partial) Approximate Common Divisors [26] . First, we describe the new hardness problem, then discuss its relationship with the system parameters of CLT GES in the following subsection.
Definition 1 (n-Masked Partial Approximate Common Divisors) Given integers Q, q 0 , p 1 , . . . , p n , we state that x j is sampled from the distribution
where q j ← [0, q 0 ) and r ij ← (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ).
We define the (ρ, η, γ, n)-Masked Partial Approximate Common Divisors (abbreviated as n-MPACD) problem as follows. Choose η-bit random primes p i for i ∈ [1, n] and let π be their product. Set x 0 := q 0 ·π, where q 0 is a randomly chosen 2 λ 2 -rough integer from [0, 2 γ /π). Choose Q ← [0, x 0 ). Given x 0 and polynomially many samples
. . , p n ), find a non-trivial factor of (x 0 /q 0 ).
Note that we do not restrict the distribution of r ij 's and Q in Definition 1 explicitly to cover various variants; in addition, our attack algorithm provided in the following section succeeds regardless of the distributions of Q and r ij 's. We require only mild restrictions satisfied by both the zeroparameters and the re-randomization parameters of multilinear maps, which are the primary targets of our algorithm.
Hardness of n-MPACD: This paper mainly proposes attack algorithms against n-MPACD; however, it would be interesting to precisely understand the hardness of n-MPACD as well. To this end, we prove that n-MPACD is hard if PACD [26, 15, 16, 8] is also hard. The reduction is provided in Appendix B.
Asymptotic Parameters: When we consider algorithms for n-MPACD, we basically assume that parameters are set to thwart various lattice-based attacks and factoring algorithms; that is, γ (x 0 's bit size) must be large enough to prevent lattice-based attacks, so that γ = ω(η 2 log λ) [34, 15, 12] and η = ω(λ 2 ), to prevent an efficient factorization algorithm such as ECM from having sub-exponential complexity in the size of factors. In this paper, we focus on the size of errors r ij ∈ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) and the complexities of all algorithms associated with ρ.
Parameters as an Instance of the MPACD Problem
We demonstrate that the system parameters in the CLT GES can be considered as instances of n-MPACD.
Zero-testing Parameter: The zero-testing parameters (x 0 , (p zt ) j for j ∈ [1, n]) are of form
Here, h ij is distributed in a small bounded set (−2 β , 2 β ), where 2 β p i . Therefore, we can regard the zero-testing parameters as an instance of n-MPACD.
Re-randomization Parameter: The re-randomization parameters are of form
. Note that the ij 's of the errors are not chosen from the same set, unlike those in n-MPACD; non-diagonal entries are chosen from (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ), while the diagonal entries are chosen from (n2 ρ , n2 ρ + 2 ρ ). Although errors are chosen from two different sets, the sizes of both sets are almost equal to 2 ρ . This is sufficient for our attack algorithm provided in Section 4. Remark 1. In fact, by excluding some parts that have entries chosen from (n2 ρ , n2 ρ + 2 ρ ), the re-randomization parameters generated by n primes may be considered as an instance of (n − k)-MPACD as well for k < n. That is, {Π j } j∈ [1,k] for k ∈ [1, n] can be re-written by [1,k] ) is an instance of (n − k)-MPACD.
Our Algorithms for the n-MPACD Problem
We present an exponentially faster algorithm for solving n-MPACD problems; our (basic) algorithm requires O((log ρ) 0.5 ρ 2.5 2 ρ/2 ) Z x 0 operations. In [12] , the attack algorithm for n-MPACD is roughly sketched and details are omitted. We present the detailed description of the CLT attack based on our speculation in Appendix C, which achieves the complexity Coron et al. claimed. Our analysis of the CLT algorithm for n-MPACD requires two mild assumptions about the distribution of samples. Similarly, the proposed algorithm also requires two mild assumptions about samples satisfied by our main application, multilinear maps over the integers.
Overview
We provide an overview of our algorithm for solving n-MPACD problems. Our strategy follows the basic flow of the Chen-Nguyen attack; however, we require several additional ideas to manage the unknown masking Q and several moduli in the n-MPACD problem, in contrast to the Chen-Nguyen attack for the PACD problem.
Consider an instance of an n-MPACD problem: x 0 = q 0 n i=1 p i and x j ≡ r ij mod p i for 1 ≤ j ≤ 2m where p i 's are η-bit primes, r ij ∈ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ 2m, and 2 ρ p i . For randomly chosen bits b j 's, if m is sufficiently large, then for each p i there is a high probability that
For each p i , there are 2 2m possible sums
is contained in the relatively small range (−2m2 ρ , 2m2 ρ ), which is contained in (−p i /2, p i /2]. If the number of samples m satisfies an inequality 2 2m ≥ m2 ρ+3 (e.g., 2m = ρ + log ρ + log log ρ for sufficiently large ρ), then there are many collisions in the range. In fact, at least a half of all possible elements have a collision in the range (−2m2 ρ , 2m2 ρ ) according to the pigeonhole principle. Therefore, for such an m, we have
probability, depending on the choice of b j 's.
To solve an n-MPACD problem using the relation (1), two remaining issues must be considered, in terms of efficiency and correctness. First, 2 2m > 2 ρ modulus multiplications, which are quite large, are required for naive computation of the above product. To reduce the complexity, we follow the concept of the meet-in-the-middle approach, similar to the Chen-Nguyen attack. Second, it is likely that the result of the gcd computation in (1) is not a non-trivial factor of x 0 , but just x 0 . To overcome this obstacle, we additionally equip our algorithm with the concept of the divide-andconquer technique.
Let us address the efficiency issue first. We define the 2 d -degree polynomial f d,(b j ) (X) over Z x 0 as follows:
Using this new notation, we can rewrite (1) as 3
We can compute the 2 m -degree polynomial f m,(b j ) (X) via Alg
M P E so that we can solve the n-MPACD problem with O(2 m m 2 ) complexity. If we set 2m = ρ+log ρ+log log ρ, then we determine that the complexity is O((log ρ) 0.5 ρ 2.5 2 ρ/2 ).
For the second issue regarding the gcd computation result, we can apply the divide-and-conquer method. It is clear that the result should be x 0 or its divisor. If the output of the gcd computation is x 0 , then we divide the product
into four factors and compute all factors. If there is a non-trivial factor among four factors, then the algorithm succeeds. Otherwise, we select a factor that is a multiple of x 0 , and repeat the same process until a non-trivial factor is found. We can demonstrate that this process will find a non-trivial factor with overwhelming probability, and the recursive process's asymptotic complexity is still O((log ρ) 0.5 ρ 2.5 2 ρ/2 ). We provide a clear description and analysis of our algorithm in the following subsections.
If the errors r ij 's are distributed (almost) uniformly, then we can reduce the complexity further by scrunching the domain of the product up; if the domain size is decreasing, we cannot expect that ( 2m j=1 b j x j ) will have a collision in each modulus p i with high probability; however, we can expect that it will have a collision in at least one modulus p i , which is exactly what we want. In fact, we can reduce the √ n factor further from the complexity. In Section 5, we discuss the method we used to increase the speed of our basic algorithm.
Basic Algorithm for n-MPACD
Given 2m samples x j 's when 2m ≤ n and m2 ρ+2 ≤ 2 2m , we require two mild assumptions regarding samples.
Assumption 2. The rank of the integer matrix (r ij ) i∈ [1,n] j∈ [1,2m] ∈ Z n×2m is 2m, where x j ≡ r ij (mod p i ).
Note that both the zero-testing parameter and the re-randomization parameter of multilinear maps over the integers satisfy both Assumption 1 & 2; Assumption 1 is trivial. In the zero-testing parameter, the matrix (h ij ) is invertible, so it can satisfy Assumption 2. For the re-randomization parameter, r ij 's are distributed uniformly and independently; thus, the rank(r ij ) will be equal to 2m with overwhelming probability because r ij 's are chosen from the exponentially large set in the security parameter.
Our n-MPACD Algorithm: We present our basic algorithm for n-MPACD in Algorithm 1. Our algorithm consists of two steps. First, the algorithm computes a product A that is a multiple of some prime factor of x 0 . Second, if A is not a multiple of x 0 , then the algorithm stops and outputs it. Otherwise, the algorithm runs the while loop to extract a non-trivial factor from the multiple of x 0 ; that is, we repeatedly split multiples of x 0 into four factors, until a non-trivial factor is found.
Because A is a product, we can compute A's four factors denoted by A 00 , A 01 , A 10 , and A 11 via the same process used for computing A such that A = A 00 A 01 A 10 A 11 , and then check if there is a non-trivial factor of x 0 among them. If not, repeat the same process until a non-trivial factor of x 0 is found. To optimize efficiency, we divide A into four factors evenly, that is, each A i is also a product with the same size domain. Furthermore, we should set each domain of A i to take full advantage of Alg F F T P oly and Alg F F T M P E . To this end, we define A 00 , A 01 , A 10 , and A 11 as follows: In the while loop, A ∈ Z x 0 is of the form
, and so
where C is defined as before and each product is defined over all
It is clear that A = A 00 A 01 A 10 A 11 and each A i has the same form as A with a different domain for the product.
by using Alg. 2 3: if A ≡ 0 (mod x 0 ) then return gcd(x 0 , A). 4: else Set k ← 1.
5:
while k ≤ m do
6:
Compute gcd(x 0 , A i ) for i ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}.
by using (a variant of) Alg. 2
7:
if gcd(x 0 , A i ) ∈ (1, x 0 ) for some i then return gcd(x 0 , A i ).
8:
else Choose an A i s.t. A i ≡ 0 (mod x 0 ) and set A ← A i , and k ← k + 1.
9:
end if
10:
end while return ⊥.
11: end if
Subroutine for Computing A and Its Factors: We describe how to compute
Using the notation in (2), A can be rewritten as
The left term is for the case (b m+1 , . . . , b 2m ) = (b m+1 , . . . , b 2m ) and the right term is for the
, so that it is equal to A. We describe an algorithm for (4) in Algorithm 2. Factors A 00 , A 01 , A 10 and A 11 of A have approximately the same form as A, and hence we can compute it similarly to Algorithm 2.
Analysis
Success Probability: We demonstrate that Algorithm 1 correctly finds a non-trivial factor of x 0 with at least 1/2 probability, where the probability goes over only the algorithm's random tape. 4 Algorithm 1 begins by selecting b j ∈ {0, 1} for 1 ≤ j ≤ 2m. Given an n-MPACD instance x 0 and x j 's, we state that (b 1 , . . . , b 2m ) ∈ {0, 1} 2m is 'good for p i ' if there exists (b 1 , . . . , b 2m ) ∈ {0, 1} 2m Algorithm 2 Subroutine for solving n-MPACD Input: (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x 2m ) and (b 1 , . . . , b 2m ).
by Alg
We can prove that if we select b j 's uniformly and independently, then with high probability (b 1 , . . . , b 2m ) is 'good for p i ' for each p i . See Lemma 1 for details.
Lemma 1 Given an n-MPACD instance x 0 and x j 's, we have that for each i ∈ [1, n],
We provide the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix D.
Once the algorithm has a good (b 1 , . . . , b 2m ) for p 1 , then we can demonstrate that the algorithm eventually outputs a non-trivial factor of x 0 . If the while loop arrives at the end before finding a non-trivial factor of x 0 (that is, it is repeated m times), then ultimately we should have an integer
; that is, we are not able to divide A any further. Therefore, it is sufficient to demonstrate that such a tuple (b 1 , . . . , b 2m ) cannot exist, and Lemma 2 guarantees it.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1 and 2, if
We provide the proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix D.
Algorithm 1 uses the randomness only in the 1st and 8th steps. Because any A i with correct conditions will suffice in the 8th step, it does not affect the success probability of the algorithm. Only a selection of (b 1 , . . . , b 2m ) will determine the success of the algorithm, and we have a probability of greater than 1/2 for a good (b 1 , . . . , b 2m ) for p 1 . Therefore, the proposed algorithm has at least a 1/2 probability for success.
Complexity: The complexity of Algorithm 1 is dominated by computing A and its factors. The complexity of Algorithm 2 mainly depends on the domain size in the product; we require O(m 2 2 m ) operations modulo x 0 (from Alg , then it asymptotically satisfies the requirement 2m ≤ n and 2m2 ρ+1 < 2 2m , where ρ ≥ 4. Therefore, for m = ρ+log ρ+log log ρ 2
, the computational cost is
) Z x 0 operations and the space complexity is O((log ρ) 0.5 ρ 2.5 2 ρ/2 ) polynomially many bits.
Attack on System Parameters of Multilinear Maps over the Integers

Speed Increase for Multilinear Maps Parameters
We introduce several techniques to increase the speed of Algorithm 1, where all of our techniques are applicable to the parameters of multilinear maps. If r ij 's are uniformly distributed, we can increase the speed of the attack algorithm. For example, ij 's in the re-randomization parameter are uniformly distributed in the corresponding domains. Furthermore, we know the distribution of h ij 's in the zero-testing parameter. Although it is not a uniform distribution, we can consider it as a quasi-uniform distribution in an appropriate bound.
Using Shorter m: To guarantee exponentially many good (b 1 , . . . , b 2m ) for each p i , we select m with 2m2 ρ+1 ≤ 2 2m . The sum of uniform variables follows the bell-shaped distribution, so that 2m j=1 b j x j has a shorter image size than its range. Furthermore, the bell-shaped distribution has more collisions around a center than uniform distributions. This fact allows us to select a shorter m, and our experimental results provided in Table 3 support our expectation. Shorter Domain in Products: Basically, Algorithm 1 becomes a brute-force attack once we select a good (b 1 , . . . , b 2m ) for some p i at the beginning. It is likely that (b 1 , . . . , b 2m ) is good for several moduli p i 's. (That is the exact reason why we must have the while loop in Algorithm 1.) However, our goal is to select a vector (b 1 , . . . , b 2m ) that is good for only one (or a few) p i and is not good for any others. We compute a product A that is roughly 1/n of a random portion of the product A in Algorithm 1. Then, we can expect the probability, Pr i , that p i divides A is roughly equal to 1/2n. Furthermore, r ij 's are independent, and thus we can also expect that the probabilities Pr i 's are nearly independent. Therefore, the probability that A is a multiple of at least one of p i is significant, from the birthday paradox; e.g., 1 − 1/ √ e. Applying this technique, we present an improved attack in Algorithm 3. The analysis above is heuristic, and thus to support our expectations and the heuristic analysis, we provide experimental results in Table 4 . Parameters are set the average ratio between the domain and the image (modulus p i ) of 1≤j≤2m b j x j for 100 problem instances to be 1.44 for each p i .
Insufficient Entropy in Zero-testing Parameters:
The matrix H = (h ij ) ∈ Z n×n in the zerotesting parameters is selected to satisfy H ∞ ≤ 2 β and (H −1 ) ∞ ≤ 2 β where || · || ∞ is the operator norm of n × n matrices with respect to the ∞ norm on R n . In [12] , Coron et al. proposed an algorithm to generate such a matrix H, with sufficient entropy. However, their approach does not rapidly increase the entropy of H, though it satisfies the above two bounds. We will demonstrate this by providing some experimental results in this section. Table 5 5 lists the average bit size of entries in H generated by the algorithm of Coron et al. on various parameters β and n. From the last three columns of Table 5 , one can observe that average bit sizes are approximately 10 when β = 80 as in the implementation parameters in [12] ; moreover, the maximum bit sizes are lower than 30, and they are much smaller than the best β − log n, which is obtained from the bound H ∞ ≤ 2 β .
In [12, Section 3.1], the authors stated that "One can take β = λ"; however, our analysis and experimental results indicate that β should be much larger than λ. In Table 5 , when β ≤ 3λ, the expected average bit-size of |h ij | is still smaller than ρ, and for Small security, when β ≈ 4λ, the expectation of the average bit-size of |h ij | is equal to ρ; thus, β ≥ 4λ would be safe for the security of the multilinear maps. We investigate the reason why the H-generation in [12] could not increase enough entropy in Section 6. 
Implementation
We have implemented Algorithm 3 with various parameters in C++, using the Gnu MP library [1] and NTL library [33] , on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2600 CPU at 3.4 GHz with 16 GB RAM.
Attack on Zero-testing Parameter:
We have implemented Algorithm 3 to attack on the zerotesting parameters; we set n, η, and ρ as in the implementation parameters for Small (52-bit) and Medium (62-bit) security [12, Section 6.4] and generated the zero-testing parameter normally by using the method described in [13, Appendix F]. We summarize the result in Table 6 , and it displays that Algorithm 3 finds a non-trivial factor very quickly on the parameters for Small and Medium security levels. Attack on Re-randomization Parameter: We first define Toy parameters for 42-bit security.
To this end, we benchmark the parameter of FHEs in [14] , which is conservatively determined according to the complexity of the Chen-Nguyen attack [8] . In Table 7 , we provide the average running time to solve 50 problems for Toy parameters, and the experimental result demonstrates that the expected security level is tight.
In fact, the complexity difference between Algorithm 3 and the Chen-Nguyen attack is O( ρ log ρ n ) and ρ log ρ n ≈ 1 for 42-bit security. For Large and Extra security level parameters, ρ log ρ n is less than 1; therefore, Algorithm 3 will be slightly faster than the Chen-Nguyen attack algorithm. We extrapolate Algorithm 3 to be at least 2 1.38 (2 2.12 , resp.) times faster than the Chen-Nguyen attack for Large security (Extra security, resp.), with a similar storage advantage. Therefore, when one selects secure ρ size for large security level integer-based multilinear maps, we suggest that the performance of Algorithm 3 should be considered.
Discussions
Generating The Matrix H: First, we look at the method of generating a matrix H in the zerotesting parameters, which satisfies the bound H ∞ ≤ 2 β and (H −1 ) ∞ ≤ 2 β , proposed by Coron et al. [13] . For any matrix A ∈ M at n/2 × n/2 ({−1, 0, 1}), define H A ∈ Z n×n as
Let β = β log(1+ n/2 ) and randomly choose A i $ ← M at n/2 × n/2 ({−1, 0, 1}). Pick H i randomly as either H A i or its transpose for each i ∈ [1, β ], and compute H as
We can easily prove that the above resulting matrix H satisfies the bounds H ∞ ≤ 2 β and (H −1 ) ∞ ≤ 2 β ; for each i ∈ [1, β ], H i ∞ ≤ 1 + n/2 and H i ∞ ≤ 1 + n/2 and hence
and similarly (H −1 ) satisfies the same bound because H −1 A = H (−A) . Although the above approach enables the resulting matrix H to satisfy the upper bound of the operator norms, and the set of resulting matrices generated in this manner could be exponentially large, this approach does not guarantee the average and expectation of the operation norms of resulting matrices sufficiently large. We briefly explain the reason why this approach slowly increases the expected bit size of the absolute value of h ij 's, in comparison with its upper bound β − log n. For brevity, we assume that n is even number, that is, n = 2t. The maximum operator norm of H can be achieved when the operator norm of each matrix H i has the maximum value and H's operator norm is the product of H A i 's operator norms. H is a product of H A i 's and H A i 's, there would be many continuous product of H A i and H A j , or H A i and H A j in computing H. (We state that H A i and H A j are the same type, and H A i and H A i are also the same type.) Considering a product of H A i and H A j ,
Thus, H
Although the multiplicative bound (≤ (1 + n/2 ) 2 ) is utilized to calculate the operator norm of two matrices in [12] , the additive bound is enough. Furthermore, we can generalize for products of many continuous matrices of the same type. In this case, each entry of a sum of A i 's is a sum of random elements in {−1, 0, 1}, and hence its distribution will be bell-shaped and it has a value nearby zero with a high probability. Therefore, the expected operator norm of the product matrix of the same types will be much smaller than even the additive bound. , where B i is a sum of matrices. Thus, the distribution of each entry of B 1 B 2 will be bell-shaped and each entry has a value nearby zero with a high probability. Thus, we expect that H B 1 H B 2 ∞ 's expectation is much smaller than its upper bound, and so H ∞ 's expectation is much smaller than 2 β . Therefore, we expect the expected bit size of h ij is much smaller than its possible upper bound (β − log n).
Next, we present a candidate for H generation, which is expected to become immune to our attack rather than the original one, by slightly modifying Coron et al.'s suggestion. 6 According to the above analysis on the original H generation, the most problematic situation making low entropy is continuous product of H A i and H A j , or H A i and H A j . In our modification, we multiply H A i when i is odd and H A i when i is even, instead of randomly choosing between H A i and H A i . Then, we always multiply different types, so that the norm of H and bit sizes of entries of H are increased relatively quickly. Table 8 shows that the modified H generation quickly increases bit-size of entries of H in comparison with the original one (Table 5 ). However, it seems necessary to increase β to be larger than λ, in contrast to the original suggestion in [12] . For Toy parameter (with β = 80), our implementation shows that the actual security is less than or equal to 42.59 against our attack algorithm, which is almost the same as the expected security level λ = 42.
Although we suggest a candidate for H generation, it is still unclear how large β should be. According to our experimental result, it would be safe to set β to be larger than 3λ for practical parameters. However, it is open to find asymptotic bound of β for secure H generation, or to show asymptotic weakness of our modification.
Encoding-validity Test: Zero-testing Vector vs. Zero-testing Integer: In [12] , Coron et al. implemented a one-round N -way Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [3] , based on their multilinear maps. They used heuristic optimizations for implementation, in particular the zero-testing integer, instead of the zero-testing vector as in the original construction. Note that both the CLT attack algorithm and our attack algorithm for n-MPACD require more than one sample; therefore, both are inapplicable to their optimized version of multilinear maps over the integers.
Garg et al. [20] pointed out a plausible threat when using a single zero-testing element. In applications that require resilience of the zero test, including against invalid encodings, several zero-testing elements can be utilized to prevent the use of invalid encodings. In cryptographic applications such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, it is important to test whether a given encoding is a group element. Because GES is a substitute for ideal multilinear groups, it is also important to test whether a given encoding is valid, and has an appropriate level. In Appendix E, we present a (polynomial-time) key recovery attack on the multipartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, based on the CLT GES with a single integer zero-testing parameter. The basic idea of the attack is analogous to the Lim-Lee [30] key recovery attack of using invalid encodings on two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange based on group structures.
Applications Beyond Multilinear Maps:
We note that Algorithm 3 is applicable to the public parameters of a FHE scheme in [9] . In [9] two batch FHE schemes are proposed. Attacking the first scheme, called KLYC-FHE [27] , Algorithm 3 with d = √ n is asymptotically faster than the previous best Chen-Nguyen attack on the error size [8] . The public parameter in the KLYC-FHE contains
where e ij $ ← (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) for i ∈ [1, n]. x j can be considered as Q·CRT q 0 ,p 1 ,...,pn (e j0 , e j1 , . . . , e jn ), where Q = CRT q 0 ,p 1 ,...,pn (1, Q 1 , . . . , Q n ) is unknown. Therefore, we can consider these parameters as an instance of n-MPACD. In this case, the parameter τ is very large; therefore, we have a sufficiently large number of samples for applying Algorithm 3. As mentioned previously, Algorithm 3 is faster than the Chen-Nguyen attack, with the difference of O( ρ log ρ n ). In fact, the parameter n in the KLYC-FHE could be from O(1) to O(λ 3 ) and ρ = O(λ); thus, for n =ω(λ), that is, a case with a large message space, Algorithm 3 is faster than the Chen-Nguyen attack.
Conclusion
We introduce a new hard problem, called n-MPACD, by generalizing system parameters of integerbased schemes. Furthermore, we present an attack algorithm for n-MPACD with speeding up techniques and implement our attack algorithm for particular system parameters of multilinear maps over integers [12] . We also point out a flaw, which makes the cost of our attack algorithm for the zero-testing parameters drastically reduce, in the generation of the zero-testing parameter in [12] . Although we present a simple modification of the original method for generating zero-testing parameter and it seems to mitigate the flaw for practical parameters, we do not have complete figures about theoretical and asymptotic analysis. We leave it as an interesting open problem.
and zero-testing parameters {(p zt ) j } n j=1 as follows:
where z, g i , and h ij are secret information and κ is the maximum allowed level. In particular, H = (h ij ) ∈ Z n×n is invertible in Z and both H ∞ ≤ 2 β and (H −1 ) ∞ ≤ 2 β . Π's non diagonal entries are randomly and independently chosen from (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ), while the diagonal entries are randomly chosen from (n2 ρ , n2 ρ + 2 ρ ). The column vector of the matrix (r ij ) ∈ Z n×τ are randomly and independently chosen from the half-open parallelepiped spanned by the columns of Π.
Finally, the InstGen algorithm chooses a seed s for a strong randomness extractor, and then outputs the zero-testing vector p zt ∈ Z n and the other system parameters
Sampling Level-zero Encodings: samp(params)→ c. This algorithm chooses a random binary vector b = (b j ) ∈ {0, 1} and outputs the level-0 encoding
Encoding at Higher Levels 7 : enc(params,c) → c k . Given a level-0 encoding c, this algorithm outputs a level-1 encoding of the same message by just computing the product c · y mod x 0 .
Re-randomization 8 : reRand(params,c) → c . Given as an input a level-1 encoding c 1 , the algorithm randomizes c 1 as follows:
Adding and Multilinear Map: We can add encoded messages by adding encodings modulus x 0 . For multilinear maps, given level-1 encodings u j for j ∈ [1, κ], we can simply compute
7 In [12] , this algorithm takes one more value k as an input, but in the algorithm description of [12] k is not used, and hence we omit it here. 8 We omit an input variable i that is in [12] because it is not used in the algorithm description in [12] .
Zero Testing:
Given u κ as an input, this algorithm determines whether u κ is a level-κ encoding of 0 or not by computing u κ · p zt mod x 0 ∞ with the zero-testing parameter p zt .
Extraction: ext(params,p zt , u κ ) = Extract s (msbs ν (u κ · p zt mod x 0 )), where msbs ν extracts the ν most significant bits of the result and Extract s is a strong randomness extractor with the seed s from the system parameter params.
B Approximate Common Divisors and Variants
We first give the definitions of the approximate common divisors (ACD) problem and its weaker version, partial ACD, which were originally presented by Howgrave-Graham [26] .
Definition 2 (Approximate Common Divisors) We first define the following distribution over γ-bit integers for an integer p:
The (ρ, η, γ)-Approximate Common Divisors (abbreviated as ACD) problem is defined as follows. Given polynomially many samples from D γ,ρ (p) for a randomly chosen η-bit odd integer p, find p.
Definition 3 (Partial Approximate Common Divisors)
We use the following distribution over γ-bit integers for an integer p:
The (ρ, η, γ)-Partial Approximate Common Divisors (abbreviated as PACD) problem is defined as follows. Pick a random η-bit prime p and a random 2 λ 2 -rough integer q 0 from [0, 2 γ /p). 9 Given x 0 = pq 0 and polynomially many samples x j from D γ,ρ (p), find p.
Coron et al. introduced a variant of ACD, which was utilized to argue the security of their FHE scheme [14] . Here, we give its definition because it will be used as an intermediate problem to show relations between PACD and new variants.
Definition 4 (n-decisional Partial Approximate Common Divisors) We first define the following oracle O q 0 ,(p i ) , given integers q 0 , p 1 , . . . , p n . O q 0 ,(p i ) takes as inputs a vector (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ Z n and outputs x with To link the n-MPACD with other well-known problems, we introduce another number-theoretic problem, n-Partial Approximate Common Divisors.
Definition 5 (n-Partial Approximate Common Divisors) Given integers q 0 , p 1 , . . . , p n , we state that x j is sampled from the distribution D ρ (q 0 , p 1 , . . . , p n ) if x j = CRT q 0 ,(p i ) (q j , r 1j , . . . , r nj )
We define (ρ, η, γ, n)-Partial Approximate Common Divisors (abbreviated as n-PACD) problem as follows. Pick η-bit random primes p i for i ∈ [1, n] and let π be the their product. Set x 0 := q 0 · π, where q 0 is a randomly chosen 2 λ 2 -rough integer from [0, 2 γ /π). Given x 0 and polynomially many samples x j from D ρ (q 0 , p 1 , . . . , p n ), find a prime factor of (x 0 /q 0 ).
Let us clarify differences between n-PACD and n-MPACD; in the distribution D M ρ , we generalize by allowing non-uniform r ij in contrast to D ρ . Furthermore, (more importantly) the unknown masking Q is multiplied in D M ρ in contrast to D ρ . We do not restrict Q to be chosen uniformly, but it is required to have enough entropy so that it is hard to guess Q. It looks like that these two differences make n-MPACD much harder than n-PACD.
B.1 Relations
In this subsection, we demonstrate that relations among ACD variants, in particular, a relation between PACD and new variants. We prove, in particular, that both n-PACD and n-MPACD are hard if PACD, which has already been utilized in several literatures [15, 16, 8] , is hard. Relations we have are summarized in Figure 1 . In the figure, a relation between problems A and B is indicated by a line or a dotted line; A → B means that A is a hard problem if B so. If the other side relation is unknown yet, we use A B. By definition, it is straightforward that PACD is easier than or equal to ACD. Moreover, there exists a specialized algorithm for PACD [8] that has asymptotically lower cost than that of the known best algorithms for ACD [8, 16] . We can also easily check that n-MPACD is harder than or equal to n-PACD from their definitions, as we briefly discussed in the previous section. 10 Furthermore, one side relations between PACD and 1-dPACD and between 1-dPACD and n-dPACD are proven by Coron et al. [14] . We recall their results; Theorem 1 [14, Lemma 11] The n-dPACD problem is hard if the 1-dPACD problem is hard.
Theorem 2 [14, Lemma 12] The 1-dPACD problem is hard if the PACD problem is hard. Now we address the remaining relations between n-PACD and n-dPACD and between PACD and 1-dPACD (the other direction of Theorem 2).
Theorem 3
The n-PACD problem is hard if the n-dPACD problem is hard.
Proof. We consider all parameters n, ρ, and m (the number of samples) used for generating problem instances as being polynomially bounded in the security parameter. Suppose that there is an algorithm A for solving the n-PACD problem whose errors are chosen from (−2 ρ+1 , 2 ρ+1 ). By using A, we construct an algorithm B for the n-dPACD problem whose errors are distributed in (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ). Subsequently, we show that if A outputs a prime factor with a non-negligible probability, then B's advantage for distinguishing the n-dPACD instance is also non-negligible.
B starts with receiving an instance of the n-dPACD problem (x 0 , z) along with oracle access to O q 0 ,(p i ) . B chooses and queries polynomially many v i $ ← {0, 1} n to the oracle, and then receives 
where v i = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) and r 1 , . . . , r n $ ← (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ). Because v i is uniformly chosen from {0, 1} and r i is uniformly chosen from (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ), v i + 2r i is uniformly distributed in (−2 ρ+1 + 1, 2 ρ+1 ) for each i ∈ [1, n]. Then, the statistical distance between the simulated distribution of {O q 0 ,(p i ) (v i )} i∈ [1,m] and the real distribution of the instance of n-PACD is at most 
where is A's success probability. Without loss of generality, we assume that A outputs a prime factor p 1 . The third equality holds since b is completely hidden in the view of A. When b = 1, w 1 could be 0 with 1/2 probability, where w 1 is the first component of w 1 , and hence Pr[B outputs 0|E∧ (b = 1)] = 1/2 in the fifth equation. Therefore, B's advantage is non-negligible if A's success probability is non-negligible and n, m, ρ are polynomial in the security parameter.
Because the 1-PACD problem is the exactly same with the PACD problem, Theorem 3 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1
The PACD problem is hard if the 1-dPACD problem is hard.
From the above results, we can conclude both n-PACD and n-MPACD are hard problems if PACD is hard.
C (Corrected) Coron-Lepoint-Tibouchi Algorithm for n-MPACD
The CLT attack for n-MPACD takes x 0 and two samples x 1 and x 2 as inputs and computes u = x 1 /x 2 (mod x 0 ). Then, it computes gcd(i 2 u − i 1 , x 0 ) for all possible i 1 , i 2 ∈ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ). While the naive gcd computation for all i 1 and i 2 costs O(2 2ρ ) operations, their algorithm reduces the attack complexity to O(ρ 2 2 ρ ) using the meet-in-the-middle attack like the Chen-Nguyen's attack [8] with the fast polynomial algorithm provided in Table 2 . More precisely, the CLT algorithm takes x 0 , x 1 and x 2 and then computes
by using the fast polynomial algorithms.
However, this approach is insufficient to find a non-trivial factor of x 0 . The approach of computing common divisors between x 0 and a product of all candidates of multiples of a prime factor was successful to attack PACD. But, if we naively apply the same approach to n-MPACD, there is an issue we have to carefully address; because the product i 1 ,i 2 ∈(−2 ρ ,2 ρ ) (i 2 u − i 1 ) (mod x 0 ) consists of (i 2 u − i 1 )'s for all possible i 1 and i 2 , it is equal to zero modulus p i for all i ∈ [1, n]. Hence, the result gcd x 0 , i 1 ,i 2 ∈(−2 ρ ,2 ρ ) (i 2 u − i 1 ) (mod x 0 ) will be a zero, not a non-trivial factor of x 0 . To overcome this obstacle, we apply the divide-and-conquer approach used in our attack algorithms under the following assumption. Assumption 3. 2 2ρ+1 ≤ p i ; that is, the r ij 's are sufficiently smaller than p i for all i ∈ [1, n]. Assumption 4. The integer matrix (r ij ) i∈ [1,n] j∈ [1, 2] ∈ Z n×2 's rank is 2.
Note that the matrix (h ij ) i∈ [1,n] j∈ [1, 2] in the zero-testing parameter satisfies Assumption 4. We provide the full description of the (corrected) CLT algorithm for n-MPACD in Algorithm 4. The following lemma shows that each integer in the product cannot be zero modulus x 0 , so that we conclude our procedure should find a non-trivial factor before arriving at the final step.
Lemma 3 For all i 1 , i 2 ∈ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) \ {0}, i 2 u − i 1 ≡ 0 mod x 0 under Assumption 3 and 4.
We provide the proof of Lemma 3 in Appendix D.
Complexity: The complexity of computing A mainly depends on the interval size used in the product; that is, we require O((ρ + 1) 2 2 ρ+1 ) operations modulo x 0 from Alg F F T P oly and Alg F F T M P E 's complexity. Similarly, for each of A's four factors, we must perform O(ρ 2 2 ρ ) operations modulo x 0 because each A's factor uses a half size interval of I. Similarly again, we require O((ρ − 1) 2 2 ρ−1 ) operations modulo x 0 for each of A i 's four factors, and so on. Overall, the computational complexity for A and all its factors is bounded by
We can also demonstrate that the space complexity is bounded by O(ρ 2 2 ρ ) polynomially many bits from the storage complexity of Alg 
Algorithm 4 (Corrected) CLT algorithm
Input: (x0, x1, x2) Output: a non-trivial factor of x0 or ⊥ 1:
First, compute a polynomial f (X) = i 1 ∈I (Xu − i1) mod x0 by using Alg F F T P oly . Second, evaluate on multipoints {f (i2) mod x0}i 2 ∈I by using Alg
Compute Ai for i ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}. Similarly to Step 1, where Ai is defined in this paper.
5:
Compute gcd(x0, Ai) for i ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}.
6:
if gcd(x0, Ai) ∈ (1, x0) for some i then 7:
return gcd(x0, Ai). 8:
Choose an Ai such that gcd(x0, Ai) = x0, and then set A ← Ai and k ← k + 1. 10:
end if 11: end while 12: return ⊥.
D Proof of Lemmas
and the right-hand side is equal to 2m j=1 b j r ij as an integer because it is a sum of at most 2m samples and 2m2 ρ+1 ≤ p i by Assumption 1. Therefore, 2m j=1 b j x j (mod p i ) is contained in (−2m2 ρ , 2m2 ρ ) . In addition, we demonstrate that the range size is less than 2m2 ρ ; for the set {r ij } j∈ [1,2m] , we set {pos j } j∈ [1,∆] to be the set of non-negative integers and {−neg j } j∈[∆+1,2m] to be the set of negative integers, that is {r ij } j = {pos j } j ∪ {−neg j } j . Then, . . . , b 2m ), (a 1 , . . . , a 2m ) is a non-zero vector. The last equality holds "as integers" because 2m2 ρ+1 < p i by Assumption 1. The above equalities hold for all i ∈ [1, n] and the same vector (a 1 , . . . , a 2m ); thus, we can consider the product between the n×2m matrix R = (r ij ) and the vector (a 1 , . . . , a 2m ). Because rank(r ij ) = 2m by Assumption 2 and (a 1 , . . . , a 2m ) is a non-zero vector, R · (a 1 , . . . , a 2m ) is also a non-zero vector. Therefore, there is i ∈ [1, n] such that (r i 1 , . . . , r i 2m ) · (a 1 , . . . , a 2m ) = 0, hence for such i , Proof. Suppose that i 2 u − i 1 ≡ 0 mod x 0 for some i 1 and i 2 ∈ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ). Then, we obtain that i 2 r 11 ≡ i 1 r 12 mod p 1 and i 2 r 21 ≡ i 1 r 22 mod p 2 .
In fact, the above equalities hold as integers by Assumption 3; hence these can be re-written by r 11 r 12 r 21 r 22 i 2 −i 1 = 0 0 , but this contradicts Assumption 4. Therefore, we conclude i 2 u ≡ i 1 mod x 0 for all non-zero i 1 , i 2 .
E Key Recovery Attack on the Multipartite Diffie-Hellman Protocol using GES
We recall the one-round N -party Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol using the GES construction, which is secure in the common reference model under the GDDH assumption with N = κ + 1 [20, 12] ; here, N parties want to share a secret key sk using a one-round protocol.
Setup(1 λ , 1 N ). Run InstGen(1 λ , 1 κ ) → (params, p zt ) with κ = N − 1.
Publish(params, i).
Each party i runs samp(params) → c i , keeps the level-0 encoding c i as his secret key, and publishes the corresponding level-1 encoding reRand(params, enc(params,c i )) → c i .
KeyGen(params, p zt , i, c i , {c j } j =i ). Each party i computesc i = c i · j =i c j and extracts the shared secret key by ext(params, p zt ,c i ) → sk.
E.1 A Key Recovery Attack on a Single Zero-testing Parameter
In key recovery attacks, we assume that N − 1 parties collude to recover the secret key of one remaining party; that is, without loss of generality, we assume that the adversary controls parties P 2 , . . . , P N to recover P 1 's secret key in the N -party Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol using GES with a single integer zero-testing parameter p zt . Furthermore, we assume that the adversary can participate the key exchange protocol several times (polynomially many times) with the honest user P 1 using a fixed secret key. The adversary begins by generating public keys c i of P i for i = 2, . . . , N − 1 honestly. For the public key of P N , the adversary first executes Publish normally by running samp(params) → c N and reRand(params, enc(params,c N )) → c N . Then, the adversary generates an invalid encoding c N = c N +2 k X mod x 0 and publishes c N as his public key, where k is a small integer less than ν and X is a level-1 encoding of zero. 11 After publishing public keys, P 1 computesc 1 = c 1 · c N · j =1,N c j and extracts a shared secret key by ext(params, p zt ,c 1 ) → sk. When P 1 sends a message m to other parties using the shared secret key sk, the adversary obtains CT = Encryption sk (m), where Encryption is an encryption scheme predetermined by all parties.
Then, the adversary can verify his guess from an encryption under sk, similarly to before.
Overall, the adversary can obtain the whole bits of c 1 X( j =1,N c j )p zt mod x 0 with O(|x 0 |) public key updates, O(|x 0 |) Z x 0 operations and additional encryptions and decryptions, which are polynomial in the security parameter.
Finally, the adversary can compute c 1 , which is a secret key of P 1 , by multiplying (X( j =1,N c j )p zt ) −1 mod x 0 to the result. 12 
